Withdrawing from Iraq: Alternative Schedules, Associated Risks, and Mitigating Strategies

Things are continually changing in Iraq... and the plan shifts all the time... here is breif summary from Rand on the current status of change there...

Since 2007, security has improved dramatically in Iraq. The U.S. and Iraqi governments — and most Iraqis — want to see both the U.S. presence there reduced and the Iraqi government and security forces assuming a greater role in providing for public security. The challenge is to effect this drawdown while preserving security and stability in the country and in the region.

In response to tasking from the U.S. Congress, RAND researchers conducted an independent study to examine drawdown schedules, risks, and mitigating strategies. They identified logistical constraints on moving equipment out of the country, assessed trends in insurgent activity and the ability of Iraqi security forces to counter it, and examined the implications for the size of the residual U.S. force and for security in Iraq and the region. This report presents alternative drawdown schedules — one consistent with the Obama administration’s stated intentions and two others, one somewhat slower and another faster — that are responsive to these factors. It also recommends steps that the United States can take to alleviate anticipated constraints, overcome likely resistance, and reduce the potential risks associated with a drawdown.

Afghanistan: Politics, Government Formation and Performance

Here is an interesting article regarding some of the challenges we and others are facing trying to make a case for western acceptance... A Civilian Surge...


Summary

The central governments limited writ and widespread official corruption are helping sustain a Taliban insurgency, and have fed pessimism about the Afghanistan stabilization effort. However, President Hamid Karzai has been able to confine ethnic disputes largely to political debate and competition by engaging in some non-democratic compromises with major faction leaders, combined with occasional moves to weaken them. This strategy has enabled Karzai to focus on trying, with only mixed success to date, to win over remaining members of his Pashtun community, some of which have begun to lean toward or tolerate Taliban insurgents. Karzai has faced substantial loss of public confidence, in large part due to widespread official corruption, but his opponents divided by ethnicity and personal ambition were unable to form a strong electoral coalition, and Karzai is considered a favorite for re-election on August 20, 2009. Winning Pashtun support for the Afghan government is predicated, at least in part, on the success of efforts over the past few years to build local governing structures. New provincial councils will be elected on August 20 as well, although their roles in local governance and their relationships to appointed governors, remains unclear and inconsistent across Afghanistan The trend toward promoting local governing bodies is to accelerate, according to the Obama Administrations review of U.S. strategy, the results of which were announced on March 27, 2009.